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Abstract The present paper proposes a definition for the complex polysemic
concepts of consciousness and awareness (in humans as well as in other species),
and puts forward the idea of a progressive ontological development of consciousness
from a state of ‘childhood’ awareness, in order to explain that humans are not only
able to manipulate objects, but also their mental representations. The paper builds on
the idea of qualia intended as entities posing regular invariant requests to neural
processes, trough the permanence of different properties. The concept of semantic
differential introduces the properties of metaphorical qualia as an exclusively human
ability. Furthermore this paper proposes a classification of qualia, according to the
models–with different levels of abstraction–they are implied in, in a taxonomic
perspective. This, in turn, becomes a source of categorization of divergent
representations, sign systems, and forms of intentionality, relying always on
biological criteria. New emerging image-of-the-world-devices are proposed, whose
qualia are likely to be only accessible to humans: emotional qualia, where emotion
accounts for the invariant and dominant property; and the qualic self where
continuity, combined with the oneness of the self, accounts for the invariant and
dominant property. The concept of congruence between different domains in a
metaphor introduces the possibility of a general evaluation of truth and falsity of all
kinds of metaphorical constructs, while the work of Matte Blanco enables us to
classify conscious versus unconscious metaphors, both in individuals and in social
organizations.
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Consciousness Versus Awareness
A linguistic symbol is–as an abstract concept–a word defined by other words. In the
words of Marcel Danesi, the act of defining implies circularity; the sign as single
form can bear meaning only by entering into systematic connections with other
forms. (Danesi 2008, p. 292).
The processes of meaning-attribution are inherently dynamic, situated,
contextual, negotiated. If we consider the long history, and the great variety of
use of polysemous words, it becomes easy to understand why a non-ambiguous
definition is so difficult in this case. Jaynes (1986) remarked that the most
problematic uses that Western thought has made of the term “consciousness” are
equivocally compromised with the concepts of sensory perception, learning,
thinking, mind, intellect. Our definition implies specific ‘field’ choices, which are
certainly not neutral but rather guided by the criterion underlying the use of these
terms in other areas and in other traditions of knowledge. These choices have been
made not only for the sake of clarity, but also to favour the transdisciplinary
dialogue that is unavoidable in relation to such a subject.
In this respect, the twofold definition of consciousness given by Julian Jaynes is
taken as a starting point:
(1) denotative: “that which is introspectable” (much as Descartes, Locke, and
Hume posited)
(2) connotative: the analog ‘I’ narratizing in mind-space.
(Jaynes 1976, ed. it. 1984, Pag. 526).1
In this model, the narratization process (“the analogic simulation of actual
behavior”) generates the Analog I (me envisioned from within), and the
Metaphor Me (me envisioned from within observed from outside) through the
use of the metaphor ‘function’. In every metaphor there are at least two terms,
the metaphrand (“the thing we are trying to express in words”), and the
metaphier (“the term produced by an instruction to do so”). The relationship
between the metaphrand and the metaphier is an operation on its own proper
nature. Crucial in this relationship is the set of features which are transferred
between the two parts. ....“metaphiers usually have associations called paraphiers
1 This definition makes specific reference to certain functions/properties: spatialization (“a spatial quality
or mind-space”); concentration (“the ‘inner’ analog of external perceptual attention”); suppression (“by
which we stop being conscious of annoying thoughts, the analog of turning away from annoyances in the
physical world”); excerption (“the analog of how we sense only one aspect of a thing at a time”);
consilience (“the analog of perceptual assimilation”) (Jaynes 1986, p. 7–8). But both connotation and
denotation boast of a long polysemous tradition in philosophy, logic and theory of language. Danesi
(2008, p.288) makes it clear that i) the sense (or the connotation or the extension) of a term is assigned the
task of the expressing subjective meanings, and that ii) in the current scientific practice of semiotics some
words are virtually used as synonyms as follows: Reference = Denotation = Intension; while Sense =
Connotation = Extension, thus emphasizing that semiosis accounts for an intrinsically relational and
associative process, whereas meanings can only have a contextual nature. Unfortunately, in Peirce and -
traditionally- in logic, denotations = extension while connotation = intension. Moreover, Intension should
not be confused with Intention, a concept used extensively in this paper.
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that project back into the metaphrand as what are called paraphrands and, indeed,
create new entities”. (Jaynes 1986, p. 7).2
To this model of consciousness, that we support as the most comprehensive and
rational that is still available today, we shall add a model expounding–by
difference–the features of awareness, by which we mean the presence of an object
within the sensory-perceptive-motor (and vegetative, hormonal and immune) domain
of an individual. Awareness and consciousness share the functions of spatialization,
selection and concordance; the former showing a spontaneous tendency to extreme
concentration and suppression. But the analog ‘I’, the metaphor ‘me’ and
narratization are all exclusive metaphorical constructs of consciousness proper.
The choice of the term awareness to mean this consciousness without an analog I able
to narratize in a mental space, makes explicit reference to the meaning attributed to the
term awareness by sapiential, mystical and meditative traditions, be they of a religious or
of a lay nature, casting about for what Chilean psychoanalyst Matte-Blanco (1975,
1988) called the symmetric way of being: ‘experiencing non-separateness’.
Of the utmost importance in awareness is a non-narratized perception of time, which is
experienced only within a present confined by the constraints of the current perceptive
field, and, in terms of the specific objects of perception, in forms in all likelihood
analogue to what is already possible in many animal species other than man; what is
missing here is the narration of the self as an agent. This is the reasons why Jaynes (1986,
p.6) considered consciousness proper “intimately bound with volition and decision”.
The perception of time and space (with the above constraints) does exist in awareness,
but what is missing is time and space conceptualization, a function that we confine here
to the narration of an “analog I, able to narratize within a functional mental space”.3
To recall the classical Vygotskijnian quotation of Wolfgang Köhler’s work, “The
behaviour of an ape, described by Köhler, is limited to the animal’s manipulation in a
given field of vision” (Vygotskij and Lurija, 1984). The same goes for both time and
space of awareness: they are ‘present’ and ‘manipulable’, but not conceptualized.4
2 Jaynes here seems to recall a Peirce’s idea: “Intuition is the regarding of the abstract in a concrete form,
by the realistic hypostatization of relations; that is the one sole method of valuable thought”, an idea which
is a rephrasing in semiotic terms of Kant’s concept of schemata. This process is what Favareau calls
“manipulations of representation”
3 A key concept must be elucidated here. This paper proposes the idea of ‘perception of space’ as an idea
evolutionarily preceding that of ‘perception of time’. Species-specific perceptions ask for species-specific
‘image-of-the-world apparatuses’. ‘Image-of-the-world apparatuses’ able to provide multiple kinds of
‘perception of space’ (i.e. two- or three dimensional space perceptions) seem to occur much frequently on
planet Earth than ‘image-of-the-world apparatuses’ able to provide ‘perception of time’. This is not
conflicting with the statement made about qualia, which are intended as entities posing “regular invariant
requests to neural processes”, defining the notion of the permanence of properties. If a property must last
in time to pose invariant requests, temporality turns out to be crucial. But properties pose invariant
requests to neural processes which can operate totally out of the focus of consciousness or awareness.
Therefore, although always important to neural processes, temporality can be ‘out of sight’ of a species.
“A succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession. And since, to our successive
feelings, a feeling of their own succession is added, that must be treated as an additional fact requiring its
own special elucidation” (James 1890).
4 Animals live in time and space where they are able to orient themselves without conceptualizing time
and space. For example, time perception is essential to animal training. For animals to learn by classical
conditioning, a temporal contiguity is needed between one test and the other, as well as an ideal interval
which can be either steady or variable (either shorter and shorter or longer and longer). When the interval
between 2 reinforcement stimuli increases, “weaning” is induced.
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There exist many examples of veritable animal cultures, but, in the sensorial absence of
the specific objects of action, they lack a system of signs suitable for transmitting
information and meanings to their ‘physically’ absent conspecies. These animal cultures
are characterized by what Konrad Lorenz used to call the impossibility of a “perceptible
accumulation of supra-individual knowledge” (Lorenz 1973). Animal cultures and
animal knowledge depend on the sensory field, as well as on the co-occurrent object.
As Favareau put it, in summarizing a position that he shares with Sebeok and Deacon,
“we [humans] ‘manipulate representations’ (and not the things themselves)”, as to
decipher the Peircean words firstness, secondness and thirdness.5 (Favareau, 2008).
The conquest of consciousness over the above awareness takes place not only on a
species scale (phylogenesis), but also on the scale of individual development
(ontogenesis), as seems to be suggested by the apparent capability of children to fully
experience the present, which is accompanied by their relative inability to reasoning on
wide-ranging time scales, a scientific evidence-based gradual achievement in children.
All humans attain consciousness and the asymmetric functions allowing for the
perception of separateness (the full perception of being an individual separate fromwhat
surrounds him/her) after having exclusively experienced awareness, non-separateness,
the symmetric way of life (three ways to describe the perceptive picture where the one
who perceives and the object perceived are one and the same). Overwhelmed by the
consciousness of time, man seems to experience an ongoing awareness nostalgia, a
nostalgia likely to become the driving force of life itself in some humans.
Signs and Symbols: Modeling System Theory
Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of modern interpretation semiotics, defines the sign
as “something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It
addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or
perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the
first sign. The sign stands for something, its object” (Peirce 1931–58, 2.228).
The sign has implications connected to the exclusive nature of this something which
excludes and scotomizes elements over the totality of possible meanings. The sign is to
somebody: while de Saussure focuses the dyadic relation between two mental elements,
the significant (the “acoustic image” produced by a sound) and the signified (the concept
attached to such significant), Peirce fully grasps the importance of the interpretant,6 for
whom, as we will see below, the sign is not necessarily and solely conventional.
Peirce noted relations in signs and objects. He identified icons, i.e. signs that resemble
the objects they represent; indices, which are contiguous (either in terms of spatial,
temporal and co-occurrence relationship, or in terms of causal relationship) to the object
represented; and symbols, that have a conventional link with their object.
5 In Peirce, the ‘pure sensations’ are firstness to the agent, brute sensations which turn into significant
perceptions in secondness. When the agent goes beyond sensations and perceptions , to reach a network of
sensations/perceptions and a network of relations/perceptions/perceptions thirdness is induced. Synthesis
by Favareau, ibidem p. 30 (see References).
6 Peirce refers to the interpretant as being produced “in a mind”; interpretants, as significant results of
signs, make up the interpreter, i.e. his/her ‘mind’.
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The symbol is not arbitrary in Peirce, but it is so in Saussure, and, in our opinion, the
very nature of the symbol is constituted by its original native arbitrariness which fades
away as the symbol makes a transition from being a personal object to a socially shared
object. In bringing semiology into being, Saussure emphasized the constitutive relation
(for which he coined the term signification) of the linguistic sign intended as an arbitrary
union between the signified and the signifier (its sound pattern).
The adherence to two different traditions and the use of two different working
styles, and even a partisan terminology, have had a very heavy impact on semiotics
which has even been branded as a non-science. And this is where the re-foundation
of Thomas Sebeok and Marcel Danesi (2000) come in, based on the belief that the
main objective of theoretical semiotics is to establish an ontological statute of signs,
as well as to study the functions of signs.
The first step of this new proposition consists in re-defining the fundamental
components of the sign, this latter being generally referred to as the relation [A
stands for B], or [A = B] for short, in an unambiguous fashion. The [A] part is called
a form, and the [B] part the referent. The linkage of the two dimensions produces a
model, the [A = B] relation itself (Danesi, 2008).
A detailed examination of this seminal approach goes beyond the scope of this
paper. Danesi describes four modeling strategies (singularized, composite, cohesive
and connective forms), interdependent and broadly hierarchized in Modeling System
Theory (MST): singularized forms are the elements of composite forms which, in
their own turn, account for the building blocks of cohesive forms.
The fourth modeling strategy coincides with that traditionally identified as figural
modeling, is instead defined as connective in MST, “because a figural sign (a metaphor,
a metonym, etc.) is more precisely amodel connecting one type of referent (or referential
domain) to another.” (Danesi, 2008, p. 291). Here, we must stress one of the four
general principles underlying MST perspective. “Species-specific understanding of the
world is indistinguishable from the forms used to model it (the modeling principle), as
some of its essential implications. The modeling principle implies simply that for
something to be known and remembered, it must be assigned some form. The
variability principle implies that modeling varies according to the referent and to the
function of the modeling system.” (Danesi, 2008, p. 291).
Signs of Life
Wewant to reiterate it once again: the key feature of signs is their systematically relational
nature. In MST, connective forms are intended to result from some exclusively human
forms of associative reasoning and they are studied by conceptual metaphor theory, the
approach that considers metaphoric and metonymic thought as cognitive devices, a new
kind of image-of-the-world-device. This7 is the species-specific understanding of the
world of humans, indistinguishable from the forms used to model it, on a logical level
that differs from those of other forms, which anyhow remain accessible to it.
7 Along with all the broadly hierarchized forms of modelling identified by Sebeok and Danesi species-
specific to humans (most of them being common to other species), this image-of-the-world-device is what
only humans possess.
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How can humans understand something when they only have a conceptual and
linguistic experience of that something? The brain areas involved in speech production
and phonation are necessary, albeit not sufficient, elements since what is crucial is our
ability to process symbols (like in the language of signs), rather than our ability to
produce sounds. Far from being Socrates’ speaking animal (like a crow or like a parrot?),
man is a symbolic animal, as we have been taught by Ernst Cassirer (Cassirer 1944).
In general systems theory, it can be said that when the model relation is
represented by an analogy, a property of the prototype is accounted for by a different
property of the model; the relation between the two properties is defined ‘by
analogy’. In this manner many physical magnitudes can be represented: this is the
way diagrams and graphs are constructed.
In symbolic representation a property of the prototype is accounted for by a
symbol in the model, and here the relation, the model is governed by a law. Symbols
imply a semantics, i.e. they have a meaning; they can be subjected to rules, i.e. to a
syntax whereby they can be manipulated (as is the case for letters and numbers).
This is the basis of the amplitude and freedom of human representation.
Also the Correspondence by Analogy falls within this category, since it still concerns
a ‘law’, albeit very simple in nature: a proportionality (direct or, more seldom, indirect)
between two magnitudes, one of which is straightforwardly sensorial. Analogies do
differ from indices. In analogies there is no Peircean feature of relational, spatial, or
temporal contiguity. Indices imply a direct field dependence. To sum up:
Property of the
object
= property of the model, in an iconic correspondence. This implies
an object dependence, at least in the form of a mnemonic image.
Property of the
object




= symbol of the model arbitrarily chosen (co-validated in a
social context) in the symbolic representation.
An efficient model is a model that selects essential properties while ruling out all
other properties. Metaphors and models share a representative function: they are (to
someone) something that stands for something different, with goals and implications,
provided by the selection of the attributes.8
Symbols allow for a crucial distinction, a key definition, that of language proper:
as stated by Deacon, not ‘a whatever system of communication’, even when
organized by a specific syntax, but rather a “system of communication based on
symbolic reference (just as words refer to things) which contemplates combinatory
rules, including a system of synthetic logic relations across the same symbols. In this
connection, sign language, mathematics, computer ‹languages›, musical composi-
tions, religious ceremonies, protocol systems, and a number of rule-based games
could be defined as “holders of the central attributes of language”,9 something that
8 We can brand someone who is particularly clumsy a bull, as in the saying “bull in a china shop”. In this
connection (connotation, extension), we do not make reference to an individual with relatively small-sized
eyes , with horns and hooves. “Understanding a funny joke” frequently calls for making a ‘jump’ across
the different extensional domains of the same referent.
9 Deacon 1997, It. tr. p.22 my italic; it must be made clear that “holders of the central attributes of
language” are not to be designated “languages”
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other animal species have not developed, unable as they are to “get how word
combinations make reference to things”.10
Terrence Deacon, an interpreter of Peirce, emphasizes on the structurally
hierarchical nature of signs, a hierarchy that, not only and simply grows in terms
of complexity, but also in the modality whereby relations are established between
forms and referents: “Just as indices are made up of relations between and among
icons, symbols are made up of relations between and among indices (hence, also
between and among icons)”.11
A key element for transferring associations from one stimulus to another is
what psychologists use to define “stimulus generalization”, a perceptive
operation where what seems to be ineliminable is a constant “ambiguity
related to the essential parameters of the stimulus that a subject learns to
associate with an either desired or undesired outcome”.12 These are essential
parameters which will be shown (below) to be characterized by invariance, where
arbitrariness in the goal- and implication-driven selection of attributes seems to be
essential.
The aleatory nature of words, along with the circular nature of definitions,
assign to symbolic systems a combinatory power, which simply cannot be
attained by the rigour of the bijective correspondences of codes, since in the
former case the relation is systematically a one-to-many and many-to-one
relation. This combinatory power is heightened by the variability in the modeling
operations governing the relationships between these forms and their referents,
operations that we are going to analyze below by showing their conscious forms
compared to their typical unconsciuous ones.
In analyzing the experiments of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and Duane Rumbaugh
with chimpanzees Sherman and Austin, Deacon describes a crucial achievement
obtained during the tests: “The animals have discovered that the relation between
a lexigram and an object is a function of the relation with the other lexigrams,
and not only of the correlated occurrence of lexigrams and objects. This is the
essence of a symbolic relation”13 which is underlined by a very important change
in strategy -as suggested by Sebeok and Danesi in their modeling principle, in
terms of both understanding and memorization (given that also the registration of
forms is reticular and scattered in nature). At the basis of a combinatory power
there is the choice of the elements likely or unlikely to be combined, replaced,
manipulated, which produce new levels of correspondence defined by linguistics
as “semantic traits”, e.g. the absence or presence of a certain property like
“solidity”.14
Now, crossing the symbolic threshold makes the full co-occurrence of relations,
which are typical of both the iconic and indical models, completely unnecessary: the
co-occurrence of relations (and not of things themselves) gives the possibility of
making categorial speculations among the few possible alternatives, as can be
10 ibidem, p. 23
11 ibidem, p. 61
12 ibidem, p. 62
13 ibidem, p. 68
14 ibidem, p. 76
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experimentally shown by the specific autonomic-vegetative responses triggered by
exposure to a semantic field.15
In his theory of neuronal group selection,16 Edelman has suggested that a
mature brain seems to be pre-wired and well disposed to model itself to the
umwelt17 with which it is designed to co-develop after birth. Semantic traits are
characterized by a feature: they are invariant characters. And they do exhibit a
prerequisite for determining which neural group is destined to undergo selective
pressure in the brain in a later phase: they make “regular invariant requests to
neural processes”.18 Semantic traits, much as sensory features, make these same
regular invariant requests to neural circuits.
Qualia
Today the ‘mind-body problem’ is considered in terms of a relationship between
first-person experiences and the third-person viewpoint. Following Chomsky’s
introduction of the concept of mental organ into linguistics and psychology,
knowledge turns out to be a viable subject of scientific study. The central nervous
system does not actually comply with the definition of a bodily organ and/or system
either from a morphological (anatomical) or from a functional (physiological) point
of view. It has multiple functions, some well documented in biology and
physiology–from the molecular to the cellular levels, up to the neural networks–
while others are analyzed at a psychological–mental level and in relation to social
functions.
Qualia or qualitative characteristics are properties ascribed to mental states. They
consist of phenomenal properties (Harman 1990). They are proposed as independent
of the representational properties of mental states, yet accessible via introspection
(Block 1980).
The Latin term quale (plural, qualia) was first used by Clarence I. Lewis in
relation to ‘recognizable qualitative characters of the given’ (Lewis, 1929, p. 121)
and usually refers to mental states with characteristics of highly distinct
subjectivity, or to phenomenal aspects of mental life accessible solely through
introspection.
Since their introduction, qualia have been seen as a challenge to the philosophy of
mind. In its simplest form, the term denotes qualities or feelings which are
considered to be independent from their effects on behaviour. Qualia are irreducible
16 From the perspective of neural darwinism the upper brain functions are thought to result from selective
pressure occurred not only during the phylogenetic development of a species. That would also be induced
by the same anatomo-functional arrangements triggered by the competition among different groups of
neurons during ontogenesis, i.e. the development of the single individual after his/her birth.
17 The “environment” or “surrounding world”, to use the words of Jakob von Uexküll and Thomas A.
Sebeok, represents the model of the world for the body (Favareau 2008).
18 Deacon, ibidem, p. 317
15 ibidem, p. 78–79. In the experiment described by Deacon it was possible to induce and measure a
physiological response to stress, for example, through the classical conditioning to the word “cat”. A
response is produced repeating the same word and, albeit in a lower voice, some lexically associated
words of the same category, as “dog”, “animal”; or some symbolically correlated words, as “miaow”,
“mad”, that only share a phonetic stimulus.
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monads of mental states; that is, primary, indivisible elements of reality. For some
authors, they are perceptual experiences or bodily sensations; for others, mental
states associated with emotions, feelings or moods. Typical examples of subjective
qualia accessible only through introspection are the ‘redness’ of red roses or red
light, the scent of perhaps the same rose, and salty, sweet, bitter or acid tastes. In
other words, what are traditionally considered to be the specific properties of sensory
experiences.
Unless one has a theory of mind, subjectivity and access to introspective states are
insurmountable problems. One’s understanding of the other is possible only through
the recognition, in that other, of mental states similar to one’s own. Otherwise, short
of a social intersubjective validation, such an agreement would be impossible.
The qualia involved in processes of this kind are those which evolution has
endowed us with, tools which are particularly suitable for adaptation to specific
ecological environments on this planet. Adaptation in this sense is demographically
measured by fitness, through the number of descendants. These are sensory qualia.
The sense organs have developed biologically through the selection of specific
transducers that are capable of generating adaptive ‘sensory models’ in accordance
with the ability to improve the survival of the species. In the quite different context
of cognitive linguistics, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) made explicit reference to the
metaphor as a sense organ itself. It is still a metaphor, but a metaphor of an
extraordinary power and appropriateness.
In a previous paragraph as in other works, I have defined in detail the
characteristics of consciousness as being distinct from those of awareness
(Recchia-Luciani 2007). On the basis of this distinction, it is possible to identify
the sense organs and so-called ‘sensory channels’ through which awareness is
achieved by means of sensory qualia. Humans have entire ‘new’ classes of mental
states–and so ‘new’ qualia–which are subjective and accessed solely through
introspection, at least prior to the intersubjective validation made possible by a
theory of mind.19 Orientational and physical metaphors form the basis for structural
metaphors, where one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another. In all
cases, these concepts are unconceivable without postulating a psychologically
demonstrable device (a Chomskyan device) suitable for treating tropes (trans-
formations, transfers of meaning) and configuring representations; a module that can
enable the cognitive elaboration of one thing in terms of something else.
Is the ‘seven-ness’ of the ‘seven deadly sins’ or of the ‘seven wonders of the
world’ a concept explainable to those who lack the mental faculties for perceiving it?
Though it might repeat the word ‘seven’, can your parrot actually understand it? For
convenience, I have already described this type of example as a metaphorical quale
(Recchia Luciani 2007), although it is possible to define non-sensory qualia of
different classes, each characteristic of a specific type of ‘reality emulator’. Sensory
qualia are always characterised in terms of value. They are ‘primary biological
devices for survival.’ Here lies the key role of Damasio’s somatic-markers, which
19 Such mental states consist of the concepts Lakoff and Johnson called orientational metaphors - derived
from the fact that we have bodies and that they function as they do in our physical environment - and
ontological or physical metaphors - derived from our interaction with physical objects, substances and
entities.
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are believed to have preceded, in the course of evolution, any type of awareness.
(Damasio 1994). An emotion–in the sense given to that term by Antonio Damasio–
may be described as ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’, and so on, though the meaning may not
always coincide with the strict linguistic sense of the term.
In the absence of consciousness, an emotion supported by sensory qualia has no
meaning linguistically. However, it still has connotations of a richly significant
value, because it is somatic and necessary for ‘existence in life’, especially in
threatening conditions. It is therefore carefully coded into our genes in order to
ensure a constantly high stability in subsequent behaviour. The stench of
putrefaction is invariably negative. The sensory qualia, being ‘pure’, have a basic
value in terms of biological knowledge.
In humans endowed with awareness and consciousness, a sensory quale is
necessary in order to give meaning and value to the metaphorical quale it is based
on. Metaphorical qualia are characterized by a much more complex connotation of
value: the semantic differential. This has a dual origin. The value, as in many
decision-making processes, can be provided by somatic markers, and thus have the
same original ‘carnal’, bodily physiology, intrinsically and strongly emotional. As
the name indicates, however, a semantic differential is also inherently semantic, and
thus has a proper, situated significance; it is context-bound, or learned through
transmission from a bearer of a tradition, for instance, the family or another cultural
group, or a group of peers, and so on.20
Semantic Differential (on Senses, Connotation and Extensions)
Metaphorical qualia are endowed with a complex value connotation, the semantic
differential.21 This latter has a dual origin: as is the case in many decision/making
processes, it can be provided with its value by its somatic markers and thus have the
same intrinsically and strongly emotional “carnal”, bodily, physiological origin.
However, as suggested by the same adjective, it is inherently semantic. It is the
semantic differential (or sense, connotation, extension) that makes the concept of
metaphorical qualia more complex than that formulated, already 2500 years ago, in
20 Damasio himself, who introduced the concept of the somatic marker, seems to want to broaden his
definition to include what we define as a semantic differential. When asked about the origin of somatic
markers, he replied that it was in individuals, in the juxtaposition of bodily states provided by the somatic
marker onto mental images - and, I would add, onto words, abstract concepts and the like – although
‘conventions and rules need be transmitted only through education and socialization, from generation to
generation’ (Damasio 1994). Damasio also tells us that our reason (or at least most of it) has a social
origin; but he leaves the door wide open to the contributions and interpretations of individuals.
21 Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) introduced the semantic differential technique to determine the
connotations, specific to the different cultures, which confer a meaning to abstract concepts. An abstract
concept has to be assigned some specific features which are arbitrarily assessed resorting to a score (from
1 to 7) on a scale whose ends are accounted for by two qualifying adjectives with an opposite meaning
(for example, which score is given to love of country, between good (1) and bad (7)?). The statistical
analysis of questionnaires shows social trends towards “prevailing”, “dominant” meanings exhibiting
specific time and space patterns. Consider, for example, dishonour that Japanese associate (with an
extremely negative connotation) to the impossibility to respect one’s commitments to such an extent that
they consider the suicide “solution” as socially acceptable; an inconceivable connotation in Jewish-
Christian tradition.
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Plato’s (428–348B.C.) Doctrine of Ideas. Indeed, those ideas were already immutable
objects in the world of forms, and they were only accessible by means of reason.
The dual origin of the connotative value of metaphorical qualia has a
remarkable parallel in the dual origin of memories in humans: some are emotional,
sometimes traumatic, and have an immediate onset and an unconscious outset;
others are acquired through laborious learning, very often accompanied by exercise
and repetition. It is the insertion of significance into the complex terrain of the
living body that makes the values attributed to the metaphorical qualia so
exceedingly variable.
To attest that a metaphorical device is necessary for developing an explicit
understanding means that the device in question is a basic element in the
development of language. Here we refer to the two functions of language (Vygotskij
1934, 1978), one of which is to build a model of the world, and the other is to
communicate. But if metaphorical qualia are likely to become a basis for
understanding and communication, then the famous four properties which Daniel
Dennett found to be commonly ascribed to qualia–ineffable, intrinsic, private, and
directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness (Dennett 1988, 1994)–would
disappear. In fact a quale would not be ineffable–that is, communicated or
apprehended by no means other than direct experience–it would not be intrinsic–
in other words, a non-relational property which does not change in different
relations–and it would not be private–a property which refers to the fact that all
interpersonal comparisons between qualia are systematically impossible. To share
the experience of a quale requires an analogy–such as ‘red as a traffic light’–or a
description–for instance, ‘an electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength of
700 nm’.
These are acts made possible through the availability of two types of sign–
indexes and symbols–but they are also completely incapable of providing a direct
perception, for instance, granting the ability to see red to a person blind from birth.
This illustration introduces the fourth property: a quale is directly or immediately
apprehensible in consciousness; in other words, to experience a quale is to know that
one experiences a quale and to know all there is to know about that quale.
Primary Syncretic Perceptions, Late Perceptive Achievements
Here I recall the proposed distinction between awareness–the only state in which a
sensory quality can be directly or immediately accessible as a mental state–and
consciousness. I endorse Edelman’s understanding of qualia as fully organic,
functional, and strictly based on evolutionary history. Qualia are not to be considered
accidental elements or parts of some kind of representation, unless they are
metaphorical.
The syncretic-synthetic perceptions of childhood come before any analytic
approach. A child first perceives the object ‘ball’ in its entirety, including in the
properties of the object in question also the name which identifies it. As a result,
other objects with similar names will tend to be considered somehow ‘akin’, without
even considering the problem of ‘the class of the objects ball’, or the problem of
‘sphericity as a constant property’, or that of ‘redness as a property of red objects’, a
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property that can be considered constant, irrespective of the objects exhibiting it. By
the same token, from an evolutionary perspective, at least from that of ontogeny, the
‘qualia’ and their constancy in terms of properties, are not basic ingredients, but
rather late perceptive achievements.22
The status of qualia is that of ontological components of the human world,
since humans do not live in some abstract and objective ‘reality’, but within the
universe of possibilities of sensory and motor perceptions generated by their
brain. Elements such as colours, smells and sounds have proved particularly
suitable for increasing the survival of some species. These species have selected
transducers, sensory systems and brain maps suitable to ‘receive’ and use them
as constituent elements of their peculiar universe. Their existence is inherently
subjective, as they do not exist except in the interaction between the world and
the perceiver.
Given the intrinsically organic, natural and functional origin of qualia, we can
say with Edelman (1987, 1992) and with Edelman and Tononi (2000) that there is
nothing resembling a special quale with non-functional properties. What we
propose is that in hominids–particularly in the species homo as represented by the
modern heirs of Cro-Magnon–a new category of sensory devices has emerged. Its
peculiarity lies in the ability to represent something in terms of something else; that
the genesis of this device is, once again, entirely organic, natural and functional;
and that, in quite the same way as the elements of qualitative sensory experiences,
this particular representative capacity has its primary place of existence in a solely
introspective, accessible subjectivity, and its place of validation and objectification
within the context of inter-subjective recognition and comparison with others,
through the functions identified in psychology and in neuroscience (construed as a
theory of mind).
This is a biological foundation which goes beyond positivist ideals of science,
such as objectivity. It is this metaphorical device that allows the construction of
those formal models we sometimes identify with objective reality, or with the so-
called physical world. In areas where this possibility still seems feasible, its
persistence owes much to two factors: the advent of mechanisms for the validation
of explanatory hypotheses–primarily, experimental paradigms which have connoted
the advent of thought–and the possibility, in some specific areas, to build schemes
informed by a high local rationality (Sperber 1996; Brown et al. 1996).
22 The best example of this development is that reported by Betty Edwards in her wonderful “Drawing on
the right side of the brain”. Edwards is not a neurophysiologist, but an incredible teacher of drawing. The
acquisition of analytical capacities goes beyond syncretic perception, thus allowing for a perception of the
constancy of properties. Primal infant drawing is spontaneously perspective. The perception (yet to come )
of what-never-changes (with the change in the point of view) seems not to be there: when either the
perspective or the point of view change, the only thing that does not change indeed in a wheel is exactly
its ‘roundness’. At the beginning, we draw on a sheet of paper what our eyes see: then, all of a sudden, we
draw ‘Platonic ideas’. Thus we start to draw the ‘roundness quale’ that, much as a synecdoche ‘stands for
wheel’, in whatever position we look at it or in whatever position it is placed compared to our position.
Objects are on one side, and on the opposite side there is the ability to detect properties, a nontrivial
achievement, in that it is not attained by all in the same manner. Laymen do not observe paintings like art
reviewers do, they do not taste wine as wine stewards do, nor they do not hear music as musicians do.
fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) has shown that the right side of the brain exhibits some
musical functions, but only in non musicians, because musicians, for whom music is the language par
excellence, hear music through their left brain.
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The main achievement of this approach relates to the construction of a model
through which we can take full advantage both of internal theoretical consistency
and of the congruence between theory and practice. A good explanatory theory
about a deterministic linear model of a piece of reality usually allows predictions to
be made. However, we must not fall into the logical trap here of supposing that
because our senses build our world, they also literally build our physical world.
Colours, sounds, metaphors or mathematical formulas do not exist outside of the
interaction between the world and the perceiving subject.
The Permanence of Properties
If we use a screen to hide objects from a human baby aged between four and five
months, we will see typical activities of ‘research’ through sight carried out by the
baby. The infant seeks an object which exists because it is permanent. The ‘surprise’
that a very young baby shows when exposed to novelty is readily measured
calculating the duration of his/her gazing at the ‘new’ object .
Children get bored quickly, and re-introduction of familiar objects deserves only a
fleeting and careless glance. Something new reawakens the baby’s attention and
results in a prolonged gaze. This is a classic preference-for-novelty task. The
permanence of the object is connected with these properties which last in time. If,
behind the screen, a red ball is replaced by a yellow ball, the baby would still look
for a red ball, seeming not to believe that the red ball has become yellow. In talk
about sensory experience, the concept of reality is directly linked to the permanence
of properties, in a form analogous to that of classical physics, where we speak of an
intuitive concept of what is ‘real’. In an almost Kantian fashion, we recognize
substantial objects early and spontaneously as things that persist through time.
In discussions about symbolic–linguistic experiences, which encompass human
thought and language, reality is directly linked to inter-subjective validation.
Phenomenological and introspective experiences of property are not enough. We
don’t have any direct means of demonstrating whether or not what we perceive and
think is the same as what our interlocutors do. We can–or we should–assume so,
because human communication is possible only for those who have a theory of
mind; in other words, the presupposition that we share with our interlocutors
analogous states of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1988).
Sensory perception is focused on invariant features, the Aristotelian ‘essences’,
the sensory qualia, which coincide with those properties that are constant in objects
and that, as the preference-for-novelty task has proved, are perceived from early
childhood (generally after a few months of life). Sensory perception has evolved to
ensure the highest possible adherence to the ‘factual’ qualities of the objects of
perception on the basis of their relevance to the animal (as defined in Smith
Churchland 2007). This is not the case for understanding, which is available to
humans through a new class of cognitive devices. The focus on the congruence
between domains in the relationship between prototype (the thing or function used as
an ‘example’) and object (what must be understood or elucidated) is, typically, the
result of an interpretation and, as such, is susceptible to various positionings and re-
positionings, definitions and redefinitions, negotiations, conceptualizations, con-
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textualizations and re-contextualizations–all independent from any variation in the
factual characteristics of the object which we seek to understand or explain.
Objectivity is always the result of an inter-subjective validation: an agreement on
a specific quality, or on a specific collection of qualities.23 It is easy to achieve in
sensory perception, but much more difficult with an interpretation. We have no
direct relations with the world: we only deal with our perceptions of it. What gives
rise to emotion is not the ‘abstract nature of the experience’, but the assessment
which a person makes of it in relation to their own welfare. When they do not relate
to basic needs, goods are exchanged according to their symbolic value, which is
primarily dictated by the social-status value rather than by the functional one.
Otherwise why would anyone buy diamonds?
The Evolution of Representation: Animals and Abstract Thinking
Researchers in the area of comparative psychology have compared the capacity of
various species of monkeys, of chimpanzees and of humans to construct conceptual
classes, both in infancy and adulthood. The preferred means of conducting the study
is through a ‘matching-to-sample task’ (MTS) and the results suggest that even
Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) are capable of classifying based on shared
invariable characteristics by using simple associational procedural strategies. There
is no proof, however, of their capacity to perceive relations-between-relations, the
lack of which defines them as ‘paleologic’ (Thompson and Oden, 2000). These
monkeys can identify similarities and differences between single objects, but their
classification is confined to a single class (first-order classifying). Chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes), however, are able to classify on a more abstract level, attaining a simple
second-order classifying level. This means they are capable of identifying
similarities and differences in more than one class, which permits them to distinguish
between pairs of objects; not only can they put a bunch of keys together, but they are
able to recognise the similarities between a key and a similar plastic toy. This
conceptual capacity, which may be correctly defined as ‘analogical,’ is found
exclusively in chimpanzees and humans, but in both groups only after a phase of
instruction to the use of symbols! It emerges as an explicit faculty only after a period
of training in a ‘symbolic system’ (the language, or a system of tokens) which makes
it possible to codify and manipulate propositional representations. Using this system,
a five-year-old chimpanzee becomes capable of selecting objects and grouping them
into matching pairs.
The ‘preference-for-novelty task’ shows what it was not possible to measure
explicitly in the MTS tests, namely that similarities between objects are perceived by
both young humans and young chimpanzees before training, but are not perceived
by either young or adult Rhesus monkeys, despite their capacity to perceive physical
identity. Babies and chimpanzees exhibit the capacity to understand causal relations
and when trained in a symbolic system–a language or a system of labels, e.g.
tokens–they are capable of labelling components respectively as actor, object or
23 In this view, objectivity is a subjective property of a community; in science, a community organised into
paradigms ((Kuhn 1962).
108 A.N.M. Recchia-Luciani
instrument and of choosing the correct conclusion to an incomplete succession in a
causal sequence. The renowned Sarah, (Premack and Premack, 1994), in addition to
labelling, managed to complete unfinished representations of actions which involved
multiple transformations.
The availability of different types of ‘reality emulators’ is a sign of evolutionary
leaps of great significance, capable of generating new types of development from the
emergence of consciousness onwards, as posited by epistemological evolutionists
(Campbell 1974; Lorenz 1973) and some geneticists (Cavalli-Sforza, 2004), new
forms that are structured on new ‘replicators,’ which Dawkins calls ‘memes’
(Dawkins 1976), up to the onset of full self-awareness. The genesis of cerebral
structures capable of generating and manipulating metaphors constitutes a funda-
mental stage, perhaps the fundamental stage, in the natural history of man. We
understand, three centuries later, Giambattista Vico’s intuition regarding the corporal
base of all constructs, up to the most exclusively human of cognitive mechanisms, the
metaphor (Vico, 1744). From the beginning, life is possible only where transfer of
information occurs, with consequences in terms of matter and/or energy. There is no
life without independent autopoietic networks capable of replication.
The process of semiosis rather than the study of signs lies at the heart of
semiotics (Deacon, 1997, 1999), and this is also the promise of memetics.
Memetics consists in finding replicating patterns which allow us to isolate what
generates significance in systems that are structured in strata, from the biological
level, through individual and group psychology, and on to behaviour patterns
which regulate society, the economy and global eco-systems, and which influence
the planet in its totality.
The intersection between the ‘hard’ sciences, which are concerned with ‘things,’
and the ‘soft’ or ‘historic’ sciences, which are concerned with processes, is precisely
this: the identification of invariant patterns, which for a long time have been referred
to as the unchangeable laws of nature. How do the signs come into being? How do
we begin to go beyond first level relations, between sign and object, and move on to
perceiving and then manipulating relations-between-relations?
Monkeys can perceive similarities and differences between objects. Chimpanzees,
like children, are able to make second level associations, but only after a period of
instruction, the role of which should not in any way be undervalued. Studies on the
‘Baldwin effect’ showed that it is difficult to consider a ‘gene’ pattern as anything
more than a type of pre-disposition. And besides, the effects of epigenetic regulation,
behaviour and acquisition can drastically alter the outcome of the development–the
realisation of the phenotype–although without directly affecting what is copied and
transmitted across the generations.
In Deacon’s classification (1997), an icon is a first level classification; indexes
consist of relationships between icons, making them indirect representations; and
symbols consist of relationships between indexes, making them doubly indirect
representations.
The preference-for-novelty tasks show that children and chimpanzees perceive the
similarities in relationships, but they aren’t able to manipulate them, and that even
this perceptive capacity, if not cultivated, remains unproductive. Deacon emphasises
the importance of these elements, while also stressing the importance of phenomena
such as the sharing of attention and intentionality.
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Representations, Sign Systems, Intentionality
Bronckart (1996 p. 99–100) reminds us of an important distinction between ‘event’
and ‘action’, a distinction originally introduced by Anscombe.24 Referring to human
intervention in the world, he defines ‘intentionality’ as ‘proactive representation which
guides action’, and goes on to define ‘action’ as ‘an organised sequence of events
which can be assigned to an agent’. It is a definition which goes far beyond that of
‘process orientated to an end,’ which has been proposed by various scholars from
Thomas Aquinas to Husserl, Brentano and Ach. It differs greatly both from that of
Piaget, which harks back to the rather traditional notion that infantile intentionality is
expressed by the coordination between the means and the end, and that of Bruner, who
speaks of a general activation which demonstrates a diffuse intentionality preceding
the capacity to identify means and ends (a child is capable of proactive representation
but lacks the means to use it, and learns by observing adults).
Bronckart’s definition is particularly interesting, not only because of its clarity,
but above all because of its adherence to the model of interaction between sensory
and motor components of the central nervous system that today is widely accepted.
In this model there is a complex and complete convergence between sensory and
motor functions. On the one hand, the functioning of the sensory organs (more than
one or even all sensory modalities simultaneously) is impossible without the
complex motor activity of ‘targeted exploration’ of the environment, because most of
the transducers and neural systems of perception known to biology respond to variation
rather than to stationary conditions. On the other hand, one of the functions essential to
the correct execution of a motor act is forecasting the outcome of the act before
undertaking it (Dufosse et al. 1985, Kawato et al. 1987, Wolpert et al. 1995, 1998).
Without this function it is impossible to have: (a) the compensation of sensory
feedback, which is inevitably delayed; (b) the cancellation of the sensory effects due to
the movement itself; and above all (c) planning successive motor acts. The system of
‘forward models’ is multiple and integrated and can be integrated with other modular
systems and above all it can evolve with learning.
By means of multiple trials with varying strategies, including fMRI, sensomotor
activity has been localised in the cerebellum. Now, the incorporation of ‘forward
models’ makes credible the hypothesis that multiple systems of ‘mirror neurons’
may form part of the ‘neuronal correlation’ of ‘embodied simulation’ which
Rizzolatti and Gallese propose as an infrastructural neural mechanism that underlies
imitation, empathy and–perhaps–a theory of mind (Gallese et al. 1996, 2006;
Rizzolatti et al. 1996).
Even the animals closest to us do not ‘comprehend’ and ‘interpret’ symbols,25 like
humans do; they are denied access to what is ‘signified’. This is why we prefer
Bronckart’s definition to all the others. His interpretation of ‘representation’ makes it
possible to classify and render systematic the existence of different types and forms
of intentionality, and also to better specify what we mean by ‘comprehend’.
24 von Wright, Ricoeur and Habermas share similar ideas on this topic.
25 All living beings can ‘interpret’ signs that are essential to their survival; but icons and indexes cannot be
compared in complexity and/or wealth of possible meanings with the symbols we humans use. Think of
the verb ‘to interpret’ when used in relation to an animal ‘sign’ (a ‘signal’) or in relation to a novel, an
actor piece, or a symphony…
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Representation is sign, classifiable, as already mentioned, in different forms:
icons, indexes and symbols.
Proactive representation based on icons and/or indexes and capable of guiding
action (and therefore forms of intentionality) are present in higher animals, but
appear to be limited by specific sensory fields (for instance, the field of vision in
primates), and sometimes by relativity to particular objects (as happens with animals,
who lose the knowledge of how to use an instrument if it’s use skips a generation).
In other words, the forms of observable intentionality are linked to field and/or
object dependence.
It has been demonstrated that higher primates are able to use icons to
communicate. These are not devised by the animals themselves, but the animals
can use them. This is what enabled Bateson to define them in the 1940’s as ‘iconic
animals,’ though they do not possess a real sign system (Bateson 1972).
There are various types of ‘cognitive apparatus’ capable of manipulating signs. At
the highest level is that for the processing of tropes (i.e. transformations, the transfer
of meaning), the most notable of which is the metaphor, which displays the most
advanced level of asymmetry.
We do reiterate that complex communication is only and always possible in
relation to another’s ‘mind theory.’ It is based on the presupposition that mental
states analogous to ours are present in our interlocutors. Communication of mental
states is simpler if and when these latter are characterised by sensory qualia, and by
icons or indices. In humans, and only in humans, communication may also include
the sharing of mental states characterised by metaphorical qualia, narratives in which
the actors are symbols, though because of their arbitrary nature not necessarily
shared ones. Comprehending others means understanding their intention (proactive
representations, what they are driving at) and their motivations, understanding their
signs and the value connotations of these signs, such as how we know that our cat is
hungry. In the case of humans things are a bit more complicated. It becomes
necessary to identify an entire context (a ‘metaphoric landscape’, Lawley and
Tompkins 2000), in which the signs, which are often symbolic, acquire ‘semantic
differential’.
One interpretation of the term ‘intelligent’ refers to those who have this capacity
to ‘mind read’. The fewer clues that have to be provided regarding intentions, the
greater the recipient’s level of intelligence. Such a proactive representation
(intentionality according to Bronckart) can determine the behaviour of the agent
(an organism with the capacity to perform an action), as can retroactive
representation (motivation according to Bronckart). It is always the sum of
representation and value connotation (semantic differential in the case of symbols)
which explains the common use of the term ‘motivation’ as a cause of, or reason for,
justification or explanation of behaviour. I hope that this clarifies that the operations
we use when we ‘understand’ that the dog needs to go out for a walk are different
from those we use when we ‘understand’ the motives and the company strategy that
led to us being overlooked for promotion.
In the Modeling Systems Theory (MST) perspective, “Species-specific under-
standing of the world is indistinguishable from the forms used to model it (the
modeling principle)”. As Bruner emphasised in much of his writing, notwithstanding
the difficulties that psychology and neuroscience may have encountered in
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determining their significance, concepts have always had enormous weight in the
history of human civilisation.
The presence or absence of proactive representation (intentionality) and
retroactive representation (motivation) is reflected in the legal distinctions between
voluntary, involuntary and premeditated crimes. There is a criminal act only where
there is intention. The event, from Spinoza onwards, is a ‘chain of causes’. The
ability to perceive and model time (in spatial terms) enables us to reconstruct causal
chains. Conscience confers agency to the self.
Emotional Qualia and the Invention of Self-Agentivenness: The Qualic Self
We referred to the formidable capacity of our sensory systems to adhere to ‘factual
characteristics’, as typical and invariant constants of the objects of perception.
Unlike Plato, we believe that senses yield shareable results, but with value
attributions that vary according to the different ‘perceivers’.
From a phenomenological viewpoint, this strongly recalls Husserl’s notion of
‘eidetic vision’, of the ‘intuition of essences’, in Logische Untersuchungen (Husserl
1900/1901). Similarly, the proposition of a ‘taxonomy of intentionality’ with the
concept of proactive representation, seems to be an attempt to develop the types of
‘content’ and ‘direction’ of the intentional acts allowed to animal species in relation
to their different representational capacities.26
Psychologists recognise some ‘basic’ emotions which we share with all of the
other mammals–fear, anger, disgust, joy, sadness and surprise–and which recall the
value connotations of Damasio’s somatic-marker. Humans not only can evoke
complex emotional constellations, similar to those we defined above as ‘value
connotations of semantic differences’, but they can also attempt a disassociation of
the emotional content from the object which evoked it. Pharmacologically active
substances are able to provoke ‘pure emotions’ in a way which can be demonstrated
and reproduced not only on the basis of accounts, but also through modern
neuroimaging technology which is able to demonstrate functional activation of deep
cerebral nuclei, an experience already unveiled by Servan-Schreiber (‘emotions
without an object’ in Levy and Servan-Schreiber, 1997). Psychiatrists make a
distinction between anguish and fear, the former being ‘devoid of object’. In all
cases, it seems that we can affirm the possibility that in these types of experience, the
emotional is the invariant and dominant property. Also here, we find ‘qualitative
characters recognisable by data’, whether that data is of a sensory or metaphoric
nature; and we are faced with a mental state with highly distinct subjective
characteristics, or in other words with important phenomenal aspects of our mental
life which are accessible only through introspection. What we are faced with is a
emotional quale.
We understand the term ‘emotional quale’ in Damasio’s sense. In The Feeling of
What Happens (1999), Damasio dedicated pages to the vital differentiation between
26 The philosophical constructs of ‘epoché’ and phenomenological reduction seem to have different
applicability on the one hand to the objects of sensory perception, and on the other to those of ‘conscious
cognition’, intended here as the phenomenon of human understanding.
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emotion and feeling. He defined emotions as ‘complex, stereotyped patterns of
response [often] publicly observable’, and feelings as ‘private mental experiences’.
Damasio excludes from emotions the perception of all changes which make up the
emotive response. He reserves the term ‘feeling’ for the experience of such changes
(Damasio 1994). For Damasio, it is not possible to observe a feeling in another
person, albeit is possible to observe a feeling in ourselves when, insofar as we are
conscious beings, we perceive our emotional states (Damasio 1999).
Thus, feelings are metaphorical qualia because, for Damasio, they need the
hippocampus as a neural structure and consciousness as a psychic function. They
are qualia in that they are subjective mental states. We can’t observe them in
others, we can observe them only in ourselves. But if an emotion becomes a
feeling when our consciousness tells us so, when we manage to understand it,
the sensory dominion alone is no longer sufficient to be aware of it’s constituent
elements. And consciousness uses metaphorical qualia as raw material for the
construction of its stories, of its own narratives. This ontological status is
different from that of emotional qualia, intended, it must be remembered, as
‘introspectively accessible emotional qualities distinct from the object which has
evoked them’.
Beyond this step, we humans can turn our attention towards ourselves, towards
the capacity to perceive and understand the subject of perception itself. This
introduces a complex psychic operation, the construction of a perceptual illusion,
evidently advantageous in terms of evolution and demonstrable in mathematical
terms through the concept of fitness (the demographic success which constitutes the
objective dimension of survival and reproductive success). These illusions are those
of continuity and oneness, two properties that are obvious in phenomenological
experience, yet almost impossible to define in terms of pure biology. There is neither
continuity nor oneness in the complex molecules that we are made up of, not even in
any of the atoms that the molecules are made up of.
And yet, our biological make up seems to have given us a ‘qualic self’. It is the
agent apparently responsible for those complex causal chains which we call our
actions, arbitrarily but advantageously (from the point of view of evolution)
perceived as unique and constant. Causal chains have revealed themselves to be an
extremely important image-of-the-world apparatus, which have enabled homo
sapiens sapiens to be the current forerunner in the race for the ‘cognitive niche’.
It is an image-of-the-world apparatus of great and almost frightening power, but
not without limits, as philosophers remind us. To perceive and reconstruct a chain of
causes, and therefore to represent an event, is responsible for our capacity to
understand, which in this text is considered to be possible by virtue of the
metaphoric ability in humans. Attributing significance to events is no longer only a
question of perception, it is a step that belongs to the field of culture.
An extraordinarily potent and potentially dangerous metonymic operation (a part
standing for the whole) occurs when we ‘decide’ which specific invariant property, in
ourselves, and above all in others, confers the status of ‘person’. The ownership of
goods, which accounts for a constitutive ‘essential’ invariant property of man in
capitalism, reduces man to the role of an agent of accumulation of goods, including
money, the great symbolic generator of our time. In other contexts, ethnic cleansing is
possible only because categories such as ‘Jews’, ‘niggers,’ ‘infidels’ etc., are thinkable.
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On Truth (and Falsity)
Notwithstanding this writer’s natural affinity for the epistemological approach of
Thomas Kuhn (1962), rather than the social and historical nature of science and it’s
revolutions, it seems relevant to promote a return to a more Popperian tradition
(Popper, 1934), and to his emphasis on falsification. What makes theories scientific
is that they can be falsified; and that their claims are verifiable by means of a very
specific method, that of experimental observation. Here we want to assert the
possibility of building ‘a general model of experimental observation’, which is, in
fact, none other than an iconic, indexical or symbolic representation, formalised as a
non-verbal metaphor of the event-process under study (though it may be described
and explained verbally). The origin of an explanation, as well as the origin of an
experimental model, is linked to the emergence of ‘viable’ metaphors.
Lakoff and Johnson made explicit that the purpose and means of metaphor is
understanding, an understanding without which there is no experience, at least in the
domain of language: “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing
one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Here we must
clarify what we mean by ‘domain of language’. We use the term ‘language’, as in
semiology, to indicate the human capacity to use any type of code, rather than being
confined to standard verbal communication.
In our opinion, Lakoff and Johnson approach a critical juncture in their studies on
the truth (and falsity) of metaphoric constructs. Remembering the central role of
metaphor in the processes of understanding, the study of their truth characteristics
becomes the primary axis of epistemology. The judgement of the truth or falsity of a
metaphor is linked to the congruence of the relationship between two objects and the
congruence of the attributes of objects to be elucidated and those already familiar.
A metaphor which is not congruent, that is in which we do not find the necessary
agreement between the attributes of the known object and the attributes which we
perceive of the less known object, is perceived as a false affirmation.
Every metaphor has aims: it selects the aspects of a concept which it has chosen
to highlight. If the selection of highlighted aspects is such that almost all the
attributes of the known object (the metaphier) are replicated in the attributes of the
unknown (the metaphrand), then we speak of literal meaning.
‘Revelation’, ‘intuition’ and ‘inspiration’ are all metaphors which are unconscious
in origin, feasible in various ways, and the sources of, respectively, religious,
scientific-logical-philosophical and artistic narratives. Depending on the fields of
knowledge, however, the criteria for validation are radically different. For rationality,
verification can not merely be intersubjective, but must be tied to the approval of a
collective model of representation, not confined to a specific community of
scientists, but generally agreed on as a representation of the real, as is the case
with the hard sciences. Religion and politics are typically self-referential, but logic/
philosophy and art are also intrinsically intersubjective.
This is what makes so important the study of the properties of qualia, with their
variously ‘spontaneous’ adhesion to the ‘factual’ characteristics of the object. We have
seen this in comparing sensomotor qualia, which are almost spontaneously ‘objective’,
and emotional qualia, whose value connotation recalls Damasio’s somatic marker. We
have also seen it in the analysis of those subjective experiences–different not only in
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terms of emotive connotation, but because of the perception itself of the nature of
personal experience–in what we have defined as metaphorical qualia (always being
attentive, however, to the semantic differential, and to the modalities through which
they become ‘intersubjective’.) And in qualia of other categories, different in that
their orientation is outwards, away from the subject, though the subject may
eventually become one with the object–as happens with sensory qualia–either both
externally and internally (as with metaphoric qualia) or only internally (as with
emotional qualia or the perception of the invariant self).
It is essential to note that self-referentiality does not guarantee any real power over the
world, though it may gain an indirect form of power over men. An example is the
alleged efficacy of prayer to overcome epidemics, as opposed to that of antibiotics.
Conscious and Unconscious Metaphors
Jaynes intention was to assign to consciousness the function of an operator.
Similarly, and by difference, we have identified a second operator that we have
chosen to name awareness. Defining ‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’ allows us to
detect what plays an additional cognitive role, an operative function still differing
from the other functions, exactly because it is a not conscious and unaware function.
Unconscious is a) a state of mind out of the focus of consciousness, or b) a state of
mind which implies implicit learning, or c) a complex psycho-physical state
frequently mediated by the autonomous nervous system (sometimes old-fashionedly
referred to as ‘vegetative’) and/or by peptides with complex organismic functions
(neuroimmunoendocrine).
The cross-fertilization of formal logic and psychoanalysis was accomplished
thanks to the impressive work of the great Chilean psychoanalyst Ignacio Matte
Blanco (1975), whose analytical tools, borrowed from set theory, have allowed us to
trace back the various properties of Freudian unconsciousness to two fundamental
principles: the principle of symmetry and the principle of generalization. As to the
principle of symmetry, in which the reverse relation of any relation is, for the
unconscious, identical to the relation itself, the unconscious operates a ‘symmetri-
zation of asymmetric relations’. Symmetric logic and asymmetric logic coexist much
as consciousness an the unconscious coexist: what changes, according to the different
cognitive tasks, is the proportion at which the two elements of the bi-logic combine.
The way of generation of the world, which is typical of the unconscious, deals with
every relation as if it were symmetrical.
In a symmetrized relation, the absence of asymmetry makes space conceptualiza-
tion impossible. The absence of spatialization, in turn, makes time conceptualization
impossible.
A learning deprived of space and time is endowed with infinite space and time. It
is everywhere and forever. It has no story, it is no longer a process, but a static entity,
a cognitive entity which governs behaviour. A learning without story and context is
not likely to change. It is a structured information pattern destined to repeat itself,
and to exhibit features of stability and protection from change. Such an information
pattern, either innately unconscious or unconscious by acquisition, is able to induce
behaviours in relation to which it exhibits a higher level of logic.
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The principle of symmetry comes with the principle of generalization, in which
any individual member, and the class it belongs to, essentially coincide, as is the case
in metonymy whereby we identify a part with the whole. The principle of
generalization appears, also at a superficial analysis, as a basic principle for the
categorization functions of the human mind. Therefore the cognitive processing
modality of the unconscious generates classes and categories ‘automatically’.27
The expression ‘symmetrization of asymmetric relations’ can be misleading as it
seems to introduce the notion that the so-called ‘correct’, ‘initial’ perception of an
asymmetric relation is followed by an operation of symmetrization on the part of the
unconscious. It is not so: symmetric and asymmetric logics coexist much as
consciousness, awareness and the unconscious coexist. In the history of life on earth
the conquest of the asymmetric perception seems far more recent and, as far as we know,
far less spread, confined as it is to adult humans and, maybe, only to educated ones.
But, how to define the complex outcomes of the cognitive activities that life
structures into more and more complex models, be the most elementary biochemical
signals or the boldest social architectures? Attaining higher and higher levels we
witness the emergence of the memesis of patterns of semantic information driven by
mechanisms of variability, subjected to selection, protected against ‘accidental’
changes thanks to their own stability, able–through the behaviour they induce–to
transfer energy and materials. In other words: memes.
For sake of space it is impossible to dwell on this topic here: those who are
interested are invited to read a specific work (Recchia Luciani 2009), on which I
draw only some key concepts: memes are informational patterns of a signic nature
with a metaphorical relational organization, an individual generation and a social
selection, whose stability is guaranteed by their becoming unconscious (in
individuals, in groups or in institutions), i.e. a-historical.
Much as we observe in genetics with the protective effects of the information
content of genes when these latter are arranged in chromosomes, memes are
temporarily not functional, and not susceptible to environmental influences.
Chromosomes represent the specific modalities whereby several conditions are
guaranteed: generation, mutability under controlled conditions, and storage of what
has been selected in the information pattern for biological conservation and
adaptation.
Correspondingly, signs (above all symbols) within metaphorical relations–subject
to the principle of symmetry and generalization–account for information patterns for
the generation, mutability under controlled conditions, and the conservation of what
has been selected by human cultures.
Cultures that are no longer field-dependent nor are they object-dependent, both
inside individual subjects and inside social organizations. These configurations could
be both ascribable to third-order units within the classification of living beings of the
Santiago Theory of Cognition (Maturana and Varela, 1985).
Such fundamental metaphorical sign-based information patterns generate–through the
mechanisms of ‘clusters of metaphors’, described in modern cognitive linguistics–the
27 “We feel like we know something of things themselves, when we speak of colours, trees, snow and
flowers, but we only possess metaphors of things which do not correspond at all to their original
essentialities.” (Nietzsche, in Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn, 1873).
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structure of the character and personality of both individuals and social organizations. These
patternsaresusceptibletoevolution. Insexuatedreproductionmeiosisgeneratesanadditional
variety, whereas mitosis and production of proteins guarantee the systemic ‘status quo’.
Within the cultural context of an individual a similar role is played by childhood and
adolescence; the same role is played, within social contexts, by the periods of transition as
Kuhn calls scientific revolutions or historical transformations. The conscious asymmetric
informational pattern turns into an unconscious, symmetrized and generalized informational
pattern by ‘freezing’. In its atemporality it attempts to become an invariant pattern until a
revolution, drivenbynewadaptiveneeds, shakes it again, sometimesdeep in its foundations.
Conclusions: A Philosophical Framework
We will now show how some of the key concepts discussed in this work are central to
philosophical reflection. In Plato the eide arise on the basis of a cognitive requirement, to
overcome the constraints of subjectivity, which would not allow for an agreement on ‘the
truth’ of sensory contents. Quite the contrary, in this work we maintain that sensory data
are the data with the highest likelihood of a spontaneous sharing in terms of the contents
of their ‘image-of-the-world’ apparatuses notwithstanding the important ‘warning’ of a
potential extreme variety in the values that somatic markers confer to sensory data. The
eide are immutable objects in the world of forms or ideas, which are knowable only
through reason. The forms are ‘more real’ than the objects of the physical world, because
they are perfect and stable, and because they are models to which the objects of the world
are just similar in an ‘essentialist’ approach.
By contrast, in the first part of this work we argue that some constant, invariant
properties of the real objects exhibit the prerequisite for determining which neural
group is destined to undergo selective pressure in the brain in a later phase, posing
‘regular invariant requests to neural processes’. In different ways, objects which are
real, but of a different reality (sensitive or suprasensitive), differ in terms of their
substance intended in Kantian terms as what persists over time.
Methodologically, already in Plato truth as such occurs only when it is shared/shareable/
common (cum scientia), and therefore intersubjectively validated. The mind, the spirit, is
from the beginning the organ of numbers, of ideas, of thought beyond the sensitivity,
whilst the body is its prison, a kind of obstacle to thinking objectively, as objectivity is a
formalized and shareable subjectivity. In philosophy, Marx, Nietzsche and Foucault, in
different ways, have demonstrated that individual consciousness was dependent on such
factors as social relations, political relations and ideology. Gilbert Ryle has shown how
the Cartesian dualism between res cogitans and res extensa is essential for understanding
how ordinary language refers to consciousness. These are traditions of thought and
conceptual frameworks which are crucial to the history of the Western thought:
consciousness, soul, individual, I,me, self and ethnicity (from the greek ethnos, for people,
nation, race28) are all ‘optional’, albeit adaptive, constructions, i.e. ‘winning’
constructions from a demographic point of view.
28 ethnicity characterize social groups sharing a common language, culture, territory or, as Max Weber
taught us, beliefs about a common origin, based on habits, traditions and myths, but certainly not on any
biological connotations.
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All these constructions are made of metaphorical qualia organized in unconscious
social metaphors that we call memes, invariant and a-historical informational
patterns which last as long as they remain adaptive. But this is not an arbitrary
choice: as is the case in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Sprachspiel (“language-game”,
Wittgenstein 1953) we are facing a new “form of life”. Because, as the potent
aphorism of Guy Debord (Debord 1967) reads:
Ideas improve. Words and their meanings participate in the improvement.
Plagiarism is necessary. Progress implies it. It embraces an author’s phrase,
makes use of his expressions, erases a false idea, and replaces it with the right idea.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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